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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Coeur d'Alene Police Officers arrested Henry Martyn Hall on May 28, 2014, and placed him

in the custody of the Kootenai County Sheriff. Mr. Hall would spend the next two hundred and five
(205) days in administrative segregation of one type or another, consisting of a small padded room
with no windows. For months he was denied any reprieve from his cell and kept naked safe for a
smock. During much of this time Mr. Hall was on suicide watch due to various actions he took,
including at one point cutting open his wrist with an unknown object, and then later reopening the
wound and rubbing feces in it, and then refusing medical assistance to prevent infection. For a few
short weeks in October he would be taken to the Kootenai Medical Center to be treated for his
various mental illnesses.
Mr. Hall pied guilty to burglary on November 11, 2014, but maintained his innocence
pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). In exchange, the state dismissed a grand
theft charge and a carrying a concealed weapon without a permit charge, and agreed to recommend
no more than a five year unified sentence consisting of three years fixed and two indeterminate.
At sentencing, Mr. Hall had filed a Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing and Motion to
Commute Sentence. He requested that the Court give him a change at a retained jurisdiction or
impose a two year sentence. He argued that the sentence should be shortened in light of the months
he spent in solitary confinement without proper care. The District Court found that his treatment
prior to sentencing was not relevant to his sentence, and imposed a five year unified sentence as
requested by the state. Mr. Hall timely appealed from the sentence.
- 1-

Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts
Martyn Hall was born

Seattle, WA, on

Presentence Investigation

Report (hereinafter "PSI") p. 1. He spent the first four years of his life being sexually, physically,
and mentally abused by his mother's first husband. PSI p. 15. When he was four years old, she left
him at his grandparents and disappeared for four years. Id. When she returned, Mr. Hall used
marijuana for the first time at the age of eight. PSI p. 15, 20. He would remain with her and her
abusive husband for six months before returning to his grandparents. Id. Academically, Mr. Hall had
trouble in school due to his mental illness. PSI p. 15. Mr. Hall committed his first crime at the age of
thirteen, and by fifteen he would be placed in the custody of the state and sent to a mental hospital.
PSI p. 8, Tr. p. 41, L. 6-14. After that he would go into foster care but be placed with his
grandfather. Tr. p. 41, L. 15-19. As a child, Mr. Hall recalls being diagnosed with depression,
anxiety, bi-polar disorder, ADD, ADHD, and abandonment issues. PSI p. 15. He was passed back
and forth between various caregivers and encountered drug abuse among his family members. Id.
For the next several years, Mr. Hall spent time in Montana, Indiana, and Idaho. PSI p. 9-11;
Tr. p. 41, L. 25, p. 42, L. 1-25. Much of this time was spent in custody. Id. In or around November
23, 2002, Mr. Hall was arrested for Burglary in Idaho with a pending Burglary case in Montana. PSI
p. 12; Tr. p. 42-44. Mr. Hall would spend the next ten years in prison in Idaho. Tr. p. 44, L. 14-23.
During his time in prison, he would be diagnosed with various mental illnesses and be given various
medications. Tr. p. 46, L. 2-25, p. 47, L. 1-20. Upon his release from prison in July of 2013, he
reports that he was given no reintegration services and his medications simply stopped. Tr. p. 44, L.
24-25, p. 45, L. 1-4. During the next few months, Mr. Hall would be charged with drug related
-2-

offenses in Washington and Idaho.
May 28, 2014, Coeur

12-13.
officers arrested and booked Mr. Hall into the Kootenai

County Public Safety Building (hereinafter "the jail"). PSI p. 6. The jail was unable to provide Mr.
Hall with a mental health evaluation or medication, beyond social workers from ACES Community
Services finding he was a danger to himself and placing him in medical observation.

See

Defendant's Motion for Payment of Costs of Mental Health Evaluations Out of District Court Fund
(hereinafter "Motion for Mental Health Evaluation", p. 2 (filed under seal on July 30, 2014); Keith
Cousins, Mental Illness Services Limited, COEURD' ALENE PRESS (Aug. 10, 2014); Tr. p. 61, L 2-17.
Due to suicidal ideation and behavioral issues, Mr. Hall was placed in administrative
segregation, in safety cells, holding cells, and "medical observation cell," meaning a ten-foot by
twelve-foot holding cell with no open windows, and padded walls. See Jail Bureau Policy &
Procedure Manual, Kootenai County, Vol. III, 45-52, 62-63 (2008) (hereinafter "Manual"); Response
to Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum, Watch Commander Log entries for June 7, 28, 2014, July
11, 2014, August 2, 17, 19, 2014, September 4, 19, 2014, October 6, 2014, November 4, 5, 6, 7, 26,
2014, December 8, 10, 2014 (hereinafter "Log") (filed December 15, 2014); Tr. p. 27, L 10-19; p.
63, L 12-23, p. 70, L 18-19, p. 71, L 1-8. He was only allowed a smock and sandals to wear. See
id. At times, Mr. Hall was placed in restraints involving a belly chain, safety mittens, and a Restraint

Chair. Log entry for August, 1, 2014.
On or about July 21, 2014, based on the request of defense counsel and the reports of ACES,
the state moved for Mr. Hall's commitment. Motion for Mental Health Evaluation, p. 2. On July 23,
2014, Mr. Hall was found mentally ill and a danger to himself, but in violation of LC.§ 66-329(5) he
was returned to the jail. Id. On July 26, 2014, Mr. Hall opened his wrist by an unknown method and
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was

to the

Medical Center for stitches, and then returned to the stripped cell in

On July 28, 2014, the state moved to dismiss

petition for lack of a second designated

examination, in violation of the Magistrate's orders. Id; see, also, Tr. p. 30, L. 1-14; p. 62, L. 1-20.
On August 5, 2014, the District Court ordered payment for a mental health evaluation out of
the District Court fund. Order for Payment of Costs of Mental Health Evaluation Out of District
Court Fund (filed under seal). On August 28, 2014, that evaluation was completed and Mr. Hall was
diagnosed with, among other things, Major depressive affective disorder and a Generalized Anxiety
Disorder, and prescribed medications. Mental Health Records (filed under seal on August 28, 2014 );
Emergency Motion for Appointment of Designated Examiner (filed September 22, 2014).
Eventually on October 3, 2014, Mr. Hall was committed to the Department of Health and
Welfare for mental health care. PSI, p. 19; Tr. p. 30, L 1-16. On October 16, 2014, that commitment
was terminated and he was returned, now on a different set of medications, to the jail. Id.
On November 11, 2014, Mr. Hall entered an Alford plea to burglary. Tr. p. 17-23. Mr. Hall
accepted that a jury might find he had entered the home of strangers at roughly four o'clock in the
morning to steal. Tr. p. 20-23. Mr. Hall attempted to go to sentencing but due to the complexity of
his case and the fact that the victims had not been notified, sentencing was set out one month and a
presentence investigation ordered. Tr. p. 33-35.
Prior to sentencing Mr. Hall filed Materials in Aid of Sentencing and a Memorandum in Aid
of Sentencing and Motion to Commute Sentence. The state filed a Response to Defendant's
Sentencing Memorandum. On December 19, 2014, the District Court heard from the parties as to
Mr. Hall's sentence. The Court eventually held that in weighing Mr. Hall's crime with his character,
taking into account his mental illness, it would impose a five year unified sentence consisting of
-4-

three years fixed and two indeterminate. Tr. p. 77-78. The

hoped that the chance at parole

would ensure that Mr. Hall would not suffer the same fate the next time he was released from
custody. Tr. p. 79. However, the Court found that the issues of his treatment prior to sentencing
were not proper for sentencing.
THE COURT: The Court notes the defendant's briefing regarding the state of mental illness
as - at this time as a public health problem, in essence.
The Court notes that there is a great movement afoot by various states to make real changes
in caring for the mentally ill, but this Court on this day and in this case is not the forum to
resolve the state of treatment for the mentally

mental illness.

Tr. p. 78, L. 14-21.
The defendant timely appealed from the District Court's judgment.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Whether the conditions of a defendant's pre-sentencing confinement are a factor for
sentencing when they do significant mental harm to the defendant.

-6-

ARGUMENT
I.
A.

Introduction
The District Court erred in holding that conditions of pre-sentencing confinement are not a

factor to be considered at sentencing even if they arise to the level of pretrial punishment in violation
of Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
B.

Standard of Review
Sentencing is a matter for the trial court's discretion. The standard of review of a sentence, as

well as the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence, are wellestablished. "Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a
clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the sentence." State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979). In determining whether the sentencing court abused its discretion, an appellate
court reviews all the facts and circumstances of the case. State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 143
(1991). In order to show an abuse of discretion, the defendant must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive, considering any view of the facts. Id. at 145. The
governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: " '(l) protection of society; (2)
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.'" Id. quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382,384 (1978).
C.

Conditions of a defendant's pre-conviction and pre-sentencing confinement are a factor to be
considered at sentencing.
The District Court had the discretion to impose a sentence between one and ten years. LC. §

18-1401. However, LC.§ 19-2521 states:

-7-

The court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without
imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and
circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant,
it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public
because:
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or
probation the defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided
most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime;
or
(d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to the
defendant; or
(e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons in
the community; or

(:t) The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal.
The District Court was also is aware of the sentencing factors in State v. Toohill, I 03 Idaho 565
(Ct.App.1982). The Court of Appeals in Toohill held:
We believe the ABA principle-that a term of confinement should not exceed the
minimum necessary to accomplish sentencing objectives-can be integrated with Idaho
sentencing policy. The resultant formulation adds meaning to the concept of
"reasonableness." We hold that a term of confinement is reasonable to the extent it
appears necessary, at the time of sentencing, to accomplish the primary objective of
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case. A sentence of confinement
longer than necessary for these purposes is unreasonable.
In matters involving the mentally ill, however, the Court of Appeals has held:
We recognize, as did the district court, that Leach's crime was a product of her mental
illness. Therefore, the sentencing goals of retribution and personal deterrence do
not come into play, and it is likely that the goal of rehabilitation would be better
accomplished by treatment outside the confines of a correctional facility.
[emphasis added]
-8-

State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 534 (2001).

District Court recognized Mr. Hall's mental health issues.

p. 78, L. 1-10. However,

the Court determined that Mr. Hall's treatment prior to sentencing was not relevant to the sentence
he received. Tr. p. 78, L. 11-21.
Two authorities require a sentencing court to take presentence confinement into account at
sentencing. First, pursuant to I. C. § 18-309, a defendant is to receive credit toward his sentencing for
time he serves in the state's custody prior to sentencing. In this case, the District Court gave Mr.
Hall two hundred and five (205) days of credit for presentence incarceration toward the sentence.
Thus, the law requires a court to convert pretrial confinement into punishment.
The second authority is the Too hill factors. The time a defendant serves prior to sentencing is
considered part and parcel of the punishment aspect of a Court's sentence. See State v. Dana, 137
Idaho 6, 8 (2002); State v. Tousignant, 123 Idaho 22, 24 (Ct.App.1992).
The issue raised by Mr. Hall and rejected by the District Court is whether a sentencing court
should consider conditions of confinement when imposing the sentence and treat conditions that rise
to the level of pretrial punishment in violation of Due Process as a mitigating factor. In Mahaffey v.
State, 87 Idaho 228,230,232 (1964), the Idaho Supreme Court, confronted with a petition in which a

prisoner alleged beatings, denial of medical care, being held in solitary for long periods, being
frustrated in his attempts to file for habeas corpus, held:
if these facts are true, some are 'inexcusable and shocking.' There can be little doubt
but what petitioner has alleged a prima facie case of cruel and unusual punishment.
Most jurisdictions seem to adhere to the rule that while ordinarily courts will not
interfere in prison affairs, an exception will be made in cases involving a prisoner's
constitutional right to be secure from cruel and unusual punishment.

-9-

citing Hughes v. Turner, 378 P.2d 888 (Utah 1963); Harris v. Settle, 322 F.2d 908 (8th Cir., 1963);
re Baptista's Petition, 206 F.Supp. 288 (W.D.Mo., 1962).

· Application of Brux, 216

F.Supp. 956 (D.C.Ha., 1963);/n re Riddle, 372 P.2d 304 (Cal. 1962); In re Jones, 372P.2d 310 (Cal.
1962); Coffin v. Reichard, 142 F.2d 443 (6th Cir.1944); McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J.Super. 468,
130 A.2d 881 (1957). When such conditions are present pretrial, they constitute a Due Process
violation known as pretrial punishment. See lvlallery v. Lewis, 106 Idaho 227, 231, 235 (1983).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that unconstitutional conditions of confinement
may allow courts to go "beyond the traditional remedy of release." Russell v. Fortney, 111 Idaho
181, 183 (2014). At the same time, the Court of Appeals has held that conditions of confinement are
"preferably addressed in post-conviction or habeas corpus proceedings." State v. Sherman, 120 Idaho
464,466 (1991) citing State v. Sommerfeld, 116 Idaho 518 (Ct.App.1989); State v. Garza, 115 Idaho
32 (Ct.App.1988). However, those cases involve a defendant complaining that the prison does not
provide sufficient rehabilitative programming, not, as in this case, that they are being mentally
harmed by the conditions of their confinement. See id Lack of rehabilitative programming could
never been considered pretrial punishment in violation of Due Process, whereas months of solitary
confinement for the mentally ill, as will be shown in the next section, can and are.
However, no case law exists on the affect that pretrial punishment should have on a
sentencing, save for the well-developed jurisprudence of the United States Military. While there is
no obvious explanation for why the issue has never been raised outside the military, it is easy to see
why the military has developed the issue so well- Article 13 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
states:
Subject to section 857 of this title (article 57) [Effective date of sentences], no
- 10 -

person, while being held for trial or the result of trial, may be subjected to
ptmishment or penalty other than arrest or confinement upon the charges pending
against him, nor shall the arrest or confinement imposed upon him be any more
rigorous than the circumstances require to insure his presence, but he may be
subjected to minor punishment during that period for infractions of discipline.
The Court of Military Appeals found that Article 13 puts the following squarely at issue:
"Whether the circumstances of accused's pretrial confinement resulted in a denial of
due process of law."
US. v. Nelson, 39 C.M.R. 177, 178 (C.M.A. 1969). But Article 13 merely prohibits what the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution already prohibits, and so while perhaps giving a
clear passage to cite to in briefing, its existence still does not explain by its existence the total lack of
opinions on the topic of what constitutes pretrial punishment and how it should be viewed by courts
at sentencing in state and federal criminal proceedings. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)
("For under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt
in accordance with due process of law"); Mallery 106 Idaho at 231,235. In view of the lack of
authority on the issue, the military courts provide a good starting point for courts in Idaho to consider
how Mr. Hall's confinement should have been treated at his sentencing.
First, the Court of Military Appeals has construed the prohibition on pretrial punishment
thus:
From the foregoing, the conclusion is inescapable that Congress, the framers of the
Manuals for Courts-Martial, and the Army must have recognized that gross injustices
might result from any confinement system in which one accused of crime was treated
no better than one proved guilty. Therefore, to eliminate any and all forms of
punishment prior to trial, except that which is inherent in all confinement, laws and
regulations were enacted to protect the untried confinee. It must be remembered that
the only valid ground for ordering confinement prior to trial is to insure the continued
presence of the accused, as where he has earlier indicated that his obligation to
remain with his unit weighs lightly with him, or where the seriousness of the offense
alleged is likely to tempt him to take leave of his surroundings.
- 11 -

v. Bayhead, 21 C.M.R. 84, 90 (C.M.A. 1956); cf Bell, 441 U.S. at 535-540 (discussing proper
inquiry into constitutionality of conditions of pretrial detention).

placed hea,ry emphasis

on this concept in Nelson, 39 C.M.R. at 181-82 when it held:
Ordinarily the board of review is the appropriate tribunal for reassessment of
sentences found faulty at this level. However, this accused has already served his
sentence to confinement at hard labor, and the only unexecuted portion of the
sentence is the punitive discharge. Under these circumstances, were we simply to
return the case to the board of review for reassessment of the sentence, we would
thereby imply that the bad-conduct discharge may be affirmed. Such a course would
deprive the accused of all meaningful relief, and would rightly suggest that this
Court is prepared to wink at such grossly illegal treatment of men in pretrial
confinement. The disastrous effects of such a situation upon the system of
military justice itself are so manifest as to require us to eliminate that
possibility. [emphasis added]
Accordingly, the decision of the board of review as to sentence is reversed. The
record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Nary. A board of
review may reassess and approve a sentence which does not include a bad-conduct
discharge.
Military courts have approved various types of relief for pretrial punishment, from outright
dismissal, as in Bayhead, to requiring the sentencing judge to consider it as a mitigating factor, as in
US. v. Gettz, 49 C.M.R. 79, 83 (N.C.M.R. 1974). In U.S. v. Zarbatany, 70 M.J. 169 (C.A.A.F. 2011),
the accused was in "virtual lockdown" status for a period of 119 days while in pretrial confinement. The
accused was denied access to mental health counseling, despite repeated requests. The military judge
ultimately awarded 4-for-1 credit, but noted that "the court is very tempted to provide ten-for-one credit
solely on the mental health issue considering this installation's notice of the seriousness of the mental
health issues." In Zarbatany, the 4-for-1 credit proved to be "meaningful relief' since the accused was
only sentenced to confinement for six months (and thus, the confinement credit exceeded his sentence).
See U.S. v. Zarbatany, 2012 WL 215865 (A. F. Ct. Crim. App.); See also U.S. v. Tilghman, 44 M.J. 493
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(C.A.A.F. 1996) (awarding ten-for-one credit for illegal pretrial confinement in contravention ofjudge's

The military also does not restrict its review to the conditions or requirements the
government put in place. In US. v. Fulton, 55 M.J. 88, 90-91 (C.A.A.F. 2001), Chief Justice Crawford
stated:
A comi should not use its supervisory authority to impose extraordinary remedies to
vindicate wrongs unless the person allegedly wronged has sought, and failed to obtain,
reasonable, remedial relief through, e.g., command channels, either directly or under
Article 138, UCMJ, 10 USC§ 938; the Inspector General's Office; or the Chaplaincy. If
the command and staff offices have turned a blind eye toward an egregious situation,
dismissal of court-martial changes would be warranted as an extraordinary measure.
See, also, Zarbatany, 70 M.J. at 172 (finding illegal pretrial punishment where "specific complaints ...

should have put the commander on notice that [the accused] was being illegally punished [but] he didn't
care because he thought the punishment was appropriate for the crimes he had done - overcoming the
accused's presumption of innocence.").
These holdings are in accord with Supreme Court holdings on pretrial punishment allegations
brought as habeas petitions. "The courts must determine whether the condition or restriction is
imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate
governmental purpose." Id. at 229. In Bell v. Wo?fish the U.S. Supreme Court identifies some useful
guideposts in determining whether pretrial detainment amounts to a punishment, "[a] court must
decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an
incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose." 441 U.S.at 539. The Comi further
expounded in Bell that, if there is no showing of express intent of punishment the "detennination
generally will tum on whether an alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appeaTS excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
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assigned to it." Id. Conditions of confinement can amount to cruel and unusual punishment when
they deprive the prisoner of some of his basic human needs such as food, warmth or exercise. Wilson

v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1991). And "contemporary standards of decency must be brought to
bear in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual." Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1316
(11th Cir. 1999).
Thus, the decisions of the military courts as to the effect of cruel and unusual conditions that
harm prisoners and constitute presentence punishment prior to sentencing should be persuasive in
Idaho. While protection of society may be the utmost goal in sentencing, under the principles of
fundamental fairness and equity held in high esteem by Idaho's judiciary, the Toohill factors, and LC.

§ 19-2521, harmful conditions of confinement that qualify as pretrial punishment should be given the
weight they deserve when a court is determining what more punishment, if any, a defendant requires.

See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1992); State v. Saviers, 156
Idaho 324 (Ct.App.2014); State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,
460 (2002); Toohill, 103 at 568; US. v. Fulton, 55 M.J. at 90-91; US. v. Gettz, 49 C.M.R. at 83.
Without taking into account the fact that a defendant was exposed to cruel and unusual punishment
prior to sentencing, the Court cannot possibly determine the sentence which is "necessary," as it
ignores the intensity of the retribution and deterrence imposed on the individual, the now greater
need for rehabilitation, and the needs of society under all the circumstances. See Miller, 151 at 834.
This Court should find that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to recognize that
presentence punishment that rises to pretrial or cruel and unusual punishment should be a factor at
sentencing. See State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 592 (1999); State v. Adams, 99 Idaho 75, 85
(1978). This Court should remand the matter for findings as to whether Mr. Hall endured cruel and
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unusual punishment, and if so, to take that into account in crafting his sentence.
The defendant provided the District Court with facts which if believed would have been a
mitigating factor to be considered at sentencing.
As noted above, in cases involving pretrial detention, in order to show a violation of the Due
Process clause, a defendant must show that the restrictions placed upon him are "not reasonably related to
a legitimate goal." Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. Unlike a convicted prisoner, a pretrial detainee's treatment is
viewed objectively, with no inquiry into whether the government was motivated to punish him or had a
deliberate disregard for the pretrial detainee' s welfare. Id. at 539-540; see, also, County ofSacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,849 (1998); Youngbergv. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,320 (1982). Thus, in Youngberg,

the Court held restraints on the mentally ill could not be more than those deemed necessary by
professionals in a mental hospital. 457 U.S. at 323-24.
In this case, Mr. Hall spent months in solitary confinement due to mental illness. See, generally,
Log; Manual, p. 45-52, 62-63. While the jail refers to the various conditions Mr. Hall was held in as
administrative segregation, medical observation, a stripped cell, and as being under suicide watch
(Manual, p. 45-52, 62-63), its actual components are what are commonly recognized as solitary
confinement:
Solitary confinement is the practice of placing a person alone in a cell for 22 to 24
hours a day with little human contact or interaction; reduced or no natural light;
restriction or denial of reading material, television, radios or other property; severe
constraints on visitation; and the inability to participate in group activities, including
eating with others. While some specific conditions of solitary confinement may differ
among institutions, generally the prisoner spends 23 hours a day alone in a small cell
with a solid steel door, a bunk, a toilet, and a sink. Human contact is restricted to
brief interactions with corrections officers and, for some prisoners, occasional
encounters with healthcare providers or attorneys. Family visits are limited; almost all
human contact occurs while the prisoner is in restraints and behind a partition. Many
prisoners are only allowed one visit per month, if any. The amount of time a person
spends in solitary confinement varies, but can last for months, years, or even decades.
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Solitary confinement goes by many names, whether it occurs in a supermax prison or
in a unit within a regular prison. These units are often called disciplinary segregation,
administrative segregation, control units, security housing units (SHU), special
management units (SMU), or simply "the hole." Recognizing the definitional morass,
the American Bar Association has created a general definition of solitary
confinement, which it calls "segregated housing":
The term "segregated housing" means housing of a prisoner in conditions
characterized by substantial isolation from other prisoners, whether pursuant to
disciplinary, administrative, or classification action. "Segregated housing" includes
restriction of a prisoner to the prisoner's assigned living quarters.
The term "long-term segregated housing" means segregated housing that is expected
to extend or does extend for a period of time exceeding 30 days.
In 2013, the Department of Justice employed a similar definition, noting that "the
terms 'isolation' or 'solitary confinement' mean the state of being confined to one's
cell for approximately 22 hours per day or more, alone or with other prisoners, ...
[with] limit[ed] contact with others .... An isolation unit means a unit where all or
most of those housed in the unit are subjected to isolation."
ACLU, The Dangerous Overuse of Solitary Confinement in the United States (2014) (footnotes
omitted) citing United States Department of Justice, Letter to the Honorable Tom Corbett, Re:
Investigation of the State Correctional Institution at Cresson and Notice of Expanded Investigation,
May

31,

2013,

at

p.

5

(emphasis

m

original),

available

at

http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/docurnents/cresson_findings_5-31-13.pdf (citing Wilkinson v.

Austin, 545 U.S. 209,214,224 (2005), where the United States Supreme Court described solitary
confinement as limiting human contact for 23 hours per day, and Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418,
422 (3d Cir. 1990), where the Third Circuit described it as limiting contact for 21 to 22 hours per
day)); ABA Crim. Just. Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners, Standard 23-1.0(o), (r) (2010),
available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/midyear2010/102i.pdf; Eric Lanes, The

Association ofAdministrative Segregation Placement and Other Risk Factors with the Self-Injury-
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Free Time ofMale Prisoners, 48 J. OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION 529,532 (2009); Leena Kurki &
Norval Morris, The Purposes, Practices, and Problems ofSupermax Prisons, 28 CRIME AND JUST.
385, 389 (2001).
Solitary has a long history in the United States. In 1890, the Supreme Court of the United
States found:
[Prisoners subject to solitary confinement] fell, after even a short confinement, into a
semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them, and
others became violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while those who
stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover
sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.

In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890). A century later, this form of imprisonment, notably
compared by most experts as having similar effects on humans as physical torture, and banned by
most civilized nations, has exploded with popularity in the United States. See Jeffery L. Metzner &
Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in US. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical

Ethics, J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 38:103, 104-106 (Aug. 2010); Jamie Fellner,A Corrections
Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 391, 404-410 (2006).
In response, most federal circuits and states who have dealt with the issue have found that
placing the mentally ill in solitary is a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution's ban on Cruel and Unusual punishment. See Indiana Protection & Advocacy Services

Commission v. Commissioner, 2012 WL 6738517 (S.D. Ind., Dec. 31, 2012) (holding that the
Indiana Department of Correction's practice of placing prisoners with serious mental illness in
segregation constituted cruel and unusual treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Jones

'El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1101-02 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (granting a preliminary injunction
requiring the removal of prisoners with serious mental illness from "supermax" prison); Ruiz v.
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Johnson, 37

Supp. 2d 855,915 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev 'don other grounds, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir.

I), adhered to on remand, I

Supp. 2d

(S.D.

2001) ("Conditions in TDCJ-ID's

administrative segregation units clearly violate constitutional standards when imposed on the
subgroup of the plaintiffs' class made up of mentally-ill prisoners"); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F.
Supp. 1282, 1320-21 (E.D. Cal. 1995) ("defendants' present policies and practices with respect to
housing of [prisoners with serious mental disorders] in administrative segregation and in segregated
housing units violate the Eighth Amendment rights of class members"); lvfadrid v. Gomez, 889 F.
Supp. 1146, 1265-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding prisoners with mental illness or those at a high risk
for suffering injury to mental health in "Security Housing Unit" is unconstitutional); Casey v. Lewis,
834 F. Supp. 1477, 1549-50 (D. Ariz. 1993) (finding Eighth Amendment violation when "Despite
their knowledge of the harm to seriously mentally ill inmates, ADOC routinely assigns or transfers
seriously mentally ill inmates to [segregation units]"); Langley v. Coughlin, 715 F. Supp. 522,540
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that evidence of prison officials' failure to screen out from SHU "those
individuals who, by virtue of their mental condition, are likely to be severely and adversely affected
by placement there" states an Eighth Amendment claim); TR. et al. v. S.C. Dept. of Corrections,
CIA No. 2005-CP-40-2925 (S.C. Ct. Comm. Pleas 5th J. Cir. Jan. 8, 2014) (finding major

deficiencies in the Department of Corrections' treatment of prisoners with mental illness, including
solitary confinement, and ordering defendants to submit a remedial plan). See also Letter from
Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Div. & David J.
Hickton, U.S. Att'y, U.S. Att'y's Office, W.D. Penn. to Tom Corbett, Gov. of Pennsylvania, Re:
Investigation of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections' Use of Solitary Confinement on
Prisoners with Serious Mental Illness and/or Intellectual Disabilities (Feb. 24, 2014), available at
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http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/pdoc_finding_2-24-14.pdf (finding, after a systeminvestigation, that state prisons across Pennsylvania "use[] solitary confinement in

that

violate the rights of prisoners with SMI/ID [serious mental illness and intellectual disabilities],"
citing "conditions that are often unjustifiably harsh," and detailing a number of other Eighth
Amendment violations stemming from the practice of holding prisoners with serious mental illness
in solitary confinement); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Civil Rights Div. to Tom Corbett, Gov. of Pennsylvania, Regarding the Investigation of the State
Correctional

Institution

at

Cresson

(May

31,

2013),

available

at

http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/cresson_findings_5-31-13 .pdf; Response of the
United States of America to Defendants' Motion in Limine No.4: To Exclude the Statement of
Interest 2-5, Coleman v. Brown, Case No. 2:90-cv-0520 LKK DAD PC, Doc. No. 4919 (E.D. Cal.
Nov. 12, 2013) (summarizing the United States government's position on the applicability of the
Eighth Amendment to the placement of prisoners with serious mental illness in solitary confinement
for prolonged periods of time).
For example, the Ninth Circuit held that outdoor exercise is required when prisoners were
otherwise confined in cells for almost twenty-four (24) hours a day. Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d
189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979). Solitary confinement is one of the harshest penalties that prisoners can
endure. Berch v. Stahl, 373 F. Supp. 412,420 (W.D.N.C. 1974). Although solitary confinement is
not per sea cruel and unusual punishment "solitary confinement for excessive durations is unlawful
as offending the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution." Id. In fact the Berch court held that solitary
confinement for more than fifteen (15) days with a solid door or thirty (30) days with a barred door,
because of its severity, was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.
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To prove an Eighth Amendment violation, prisoners must show that the government's
~ ... -..,.,_..,

intended their actions as punishment or at least that

deliberately disregarded a known

problem. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). For example, in Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266
F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2001), the petitioner had to prove that her son, a mentally ill inmate who had a
history of mental illness and suicide attempts, had (1) recently lost nearly one-third of his body
weight, (2) written letters to his mother contemplating his death, (3) written a last will and
testament, (4) told guards that he planned to commit suicide, and (5) covered his cell openings
with toilet paper so that it was difficult to see inside, so as simply to state a claim that guards
were aware of a substantial risk that inmate would commit suicide. As argued above, Mr. Hall
need not make this showing as a pretrial detainee to establish a Due Process violation. Thus,
considering that he was subjected to treatment that would be deemed cruel and unusual, it should
be clear that a Due Process violation can be proven.
Additionally, the legislature ofldaho has also found that seclusion and restraints should not
be used on the mentally ill except under certain circumstances:
Restraints shall not be applied to a patient nor shall a patient be secluded unless it is
determined that such restraint or seclusion is necessary for the patient's safety or for
the safety of others. Every instance of a restraint or seclusion of a patient shall be
documented in the clinical record of the patient. In addition, every instance of a
restraint or seclusion shall be evaluated and the evaluation and reasons for such
restraint or seclusion shall be made a part of the clinical record of the patient under
the signature of a licensed physician or, as delegated through the bylaws of the
hospital's medical or professional staff, other practitioners licensed to practice
independently. Whenever a peace officer deems it necessary to apply restraints to a
patient while transporting the patient from one (1) facility to another and that restraint
is against the medical advice of a licensed physician, the officer shall document the
use of restraints in a report to be included in the clinical record.
LC. § 66-345. The fact that this law is intended for hospitals and not jails should not be seen as
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some carte blanche for jails to do to the mentally ill what hospitals may not, but rather as an
oversight; a mistake resulting from the fact that jails were never intended to house the mentally ill.

See State v. Hargis, 126 Idaho 727, 731 (1995) (holding prejudgment detainees with mental health
problems may be committed under Title 66 or Title 18 depending on the detainee's issue). As the
Supreme Court held in Youngberg, the decision to restrain the mentally ill must be made by
professionals:
By "professional" decisionmaker, we mean a person competent, whether by
education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue. Long-term
treatment decisions normally should be made by persons with degrees in medicine or
nursing, or with appropriate training in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or
the care and training of the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding
care-including decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be
made in many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject to
the supervision of qualified persons.
457 U.S. at 324 n. 30. The jail had no one with the requisite formal education making the decision to
place Mr. Hall into solitary. The decision was made by guards on the basis of policies adopted by
law enforcement.
Therefore, it is clear that the District Court was aware of facts which, if believed, would have
shown that Mr. Hall had been exposed to presentence conditions of confinement that are in violation
of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and thus certainly a violation of his Due
Process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and Art. I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution.
The District Court in this case found that Mr. Hall was mentally ill. Tr. p. 77-78. It further
recognized that illness' impact on his life. Tr. p. 78 L. 1-10. However, the District Court did not
make any findings as to whether Mr. Hall had been exposed to long periods of seclusions, restraints,
and improper mental health treatment. Tr. p. 78, L. 11-21. The District Court did not make these
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findings because the District Court did not believe these facts, if found by the District Court, should
the sentence. Id. The Court did not find that solitary confinement for the mentally ill is not
pretrial punishment in violation of Due Process. See id. If the Court had, such a conclusion would
have been in error. For the purposes of this appeal, however, it if sufficient to note that the error in
not recognizing the significance of Mr. Hall's conditions of confinement on his sentence that
occurred was not harmless, because if the District Court had recognized that presentence conditions
of confinement could affect the sentence, they most certainly would have in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, this Court is asked to reverse the judgment of the District Court
and remand for a new sentencing that will take into account the state's treatment of Mr. Hall's during
his pretrial incarceration.
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